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NOTE
The Extension of Comity to Foreign Bankruptcy
Proceedings: Philadelphia Gear Corp. v.
Philadelphia Gear de Mexico, S.A.
I. Introduction
As commercial transactions have become increasingly interna-
tional in nature, the prospect of being embroiled in a dispute with a
foreign corporation involved in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding has
likewise become more widespread. Bankruptcy' proceedings in one
country will often have serious ramifications for creditors located in
other countries. As a result of the lack of formal cooperation among
countries, at present there exists no uniform international bankruptcy
law or method for courts to apply when dealing with international
bankruptcies. Courts have, of necessity, been forced to rely on the
"nebulous"2 doctrine of international comity3 to provide them with
some guidance on how to approach foreign bankruptcy proceedings.
Comity is generally defined as a rule of courtesy whereby a court defers
to the concomitant jurisdiction of another court already exercising ju-
risdiction over the matter in question.4 The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico,5 di-
rectly addressed the question of what factors and policies a federal
court should consider when presented with a request for the extension
of comity to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding.6 Although the Philadel-
phia Gear court was not the first court to enumerate the relevant factors
in balancing the potentially conflicting policy concerns inherent in the
I The term "bankruptcy" as used in this Note refers to the different types of insolvency
proceedings recognized under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993), including reorganizations and liquidations.
2 Stacey A. Morales & Barbara A. Deutsch, Bankruptcy Code Section 304 and U.S. Recogni-
tion of Foreign Bankruptcies: The Tyranny of Comity, 39 Bus. LAw. 1573, 1587 (1984).
3 For the definition of the "doctrine of international comity," see infra note 54 and
accompanying text.
' BARRON's LAW DICrIONARY 81 (3d ed. 1991).
5 Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico, S.A., 44 F.3d 187 (3d Cir.
1994).
6 Extending comity to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding usually involves either the stay-
ing, transferring, or dismissal of an action (pending before a U.S. court) in which the bank-
rupt debtor is named as a defendant, on the ground that the debtor has commenced or is
presently involved in bankruptcy proceedings in a foreign country.
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concept of comity,7 Philadelphia Gear did outline the procedure to be
followed by a court when determining whether or not to extend comity
to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding. 8 In doing so, the court clearly
established a strong presumption favoring the extension of comity,
placing the burden on the district courts to develop and fully explain
the reasons for their denial of comity in a particular case.9
This Note analyzes Philadelphia Gear's interpretation of the comity
doctrine as it relates to international bankruptcies. Part II of this Note
discusses the facts and holdings of Philadelphia Gear.10 Part III explores
the relevant background law, focusing on the policy considerations un-
derlying the concept of comity," and the competing approaches
courts have taken toward the recognition of foreign bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.1 2 Part IV examines the procedure developed by the Third
Circuit for district courts to follow when making comity determina-
tions, in light of the recent case law. 13 Finally, this Note concludes that
the Philadelphia Gear court's adoption of a more expansive view of com-
ity is consistent with the modern trend favoring the extension of com-
ity and with congressional intent to encourage comity in the foreign
bankruptcy context.14
II. Statement of the Case
A. Factual Background
In 1968, pursuant to an agreement, Philadelphia Gear Corpora-
tion (PGC) and several Mexican investors formed Philadelphia Gear
Mexicana, later known as Philadelphia Gear de Mexico (PGMex). 5
Under the agreement, PGMex was to manufacture PGC's products in
Mexico.16 The PGMex entity was to last for a term of 99 years.1 7 A
separate sales agreement gave PGMex exclusive rights to sell PGC
products in Mexico. 18 In a third agreement (1968 Technical Assist-
ance Agreement), PGC agreed to provide technical assistance for
7 See, e.g., Remington Rand Corp. v. Business Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1266-68 (3d Cir.
1987); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 456-59 (2d Cir. 1985).
8 See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 15-53 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 78-94, 108-70, and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 171-91 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
15 Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico, S.A., No. 91-6250, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17210, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 1993). At the time Philadelphia Gear Mexi-
cana was formed, PGC owned a 49% interest in the company and the Mexican investors
owned a 51% interest. In 1987, Philadelphia Gear Mexicana merged into PGMex. See Phila-
delphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico, S.A., 44 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir. 1994).
16 Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico, SA, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17210, at *2.
17 Id.
18 Id However, in subsequent agreements, PGC expressly reserved the right to appoint
other distributors for its products. Id. at *3.
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PGMex to manufacture PGC products in Mexico, and to license PGC's
trademark and patents for that purpose. 19 From 1968 through 1990,
PGC and PGMex executed various agreements governing their rela-
tionship,20 including a 1988 Technical Agreement 2' and a 1990 Sales
Agreement. 22 Both agreements contained termination clauses.23 In
1991, a dispute arose as to whether PGC had properly terminated its
contractual relationship with PGMex in accordance with the terms of
the termination clauses. This dispute led to PGC's filing a complaint
against PGMex in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. 24
1. The District Court
At the district court level, PGC was seeking a declaration that it
had properly terminated the 1988 Technical Agreement and the 1990
Sales Agreement, and for this reason, PGMex no longer had a contrac-
tual right to continue to: (1) use the trademark "Philadelphia Gear";
(2) manufacture or sell PGC products in Mexico; (3) act as PGC's sales
representative in Mexico; or (4) retain PGC's technical material, data,
and drawings.25 PGMex filed its answer and a counterclaim alleging
that PGC had breached its agreements with PGMex. 26 On July 20,
1993, PGC filed a motion for summary judgment on both its complaint
and PGMex's counterclaim.2 7 On October 5, while PGC's motion for
summary judgment was pending, the district court received a Letter
Rogatory28 from a Mexican court, requesting that the district court stay
or transfer the pending action to Mexico.29 The Mexican court issued
19 Id. at *4. The Agreement also provided that PGMex would not have to pay a fee for
technical assistance so long as PGC remained a 49% shareholder in PGMex. In 1986 and
1987, however, one of the Mexican investors agreed to pay license fees in return for PGC's
technical assistance. Id. at *4-5.
20 Id
21 Id. at *5.
22 Id. at *3.
23 The 1988 Technical Agreement contained a clause which expressly stated that parties
were entitled to terminate the Agreement by giving three months written notice, upon the
occurrence of specified events. Id. at *5. The 1990 Sales Agreement contained a termination
clause stating that the Agreement would remain in force until either party gave the other
thirty days written notice of its intention to terminate, without cause. Id. at *3.
24 Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico, S.A., 44 F.3d 187, 190 (3d
Cir. 1994).
25 Id.
26 Id. PGMex had made a motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens,
which the district court had denied. Id.
27 Id. PGMex filed its opposition to the motion for summary judgment on August 31,
1993. Id.
28 A "Letter Rogatory" is a "formal communication from a court in which an action is
pending, to a foreign court," generally used to request that the testimony of a witness resid-
ing in such foreign jurisdiction be taken by the court to which the letter was sent. BARRON'S
LAw DIcnoNARv 427 (3d ed. 1991). In Philadelphia Gear, however, the Letter Rogatory was
used as a formal communication by the Mexican court to request that comity be extended to
the Mexican proceedings. 44 F.3d at 190.
29 Philadelphia Gear, 44 F.3d at 190. The Third Circuit noted that there appeared to be a
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the letter at the request of PGMex, which had instituted a suspension
of payments proceeding in Mexico pursuant to Mexican law.30 PGC
filed its brief in opposition to the relief sought in the letter, along with
the opinion of a Mexican attorney contending that the Letter Rogatory
was ineffective.31
On December 9, 1993, the district court granted summary judg-
ment to PGC on both the complaint and the counterclaim, without
making any reference in its opinion to the Letter. Rogatory.3 2 On De-
cember 10, PGMex filed its brief in support of the Letter Rogatory,
along with the opinion of a Mexican attorney asserting that the letter
should be honored.33 PGMex then appealed to the Third Circuit,
challenging: (1) the district court's refusal to extend comity to the
Mexican bankruptcy proceeding, and (2) the district court's grant of
summary judgment to PGC.3 4
2. The Court of Appeals
a. The Majority
The Third Circuit focused solely on the issue of whether the dis-
trict court had abused its discretion in not extending comity to the
Letter Rogatory.35 The court held that PGMex had presented a prima
facie case for the extension of comity to the Mexican bankruptcy pro-
ceeding and that the district court had abused its discretion 36 when it
granted summary judgment to PGC without making any factual find-
ings on the comity issue.37 Because the Third Circuit could not con-
discrepancy in the parties' briefs as to who had served the Letter Rogatory on the district
court; however, the Third Circuit treated the method of service as irrelevant for purposes of
the appeal since neither party made an issue of it on appeal. Il at 190 n.1.
Id. at 190. PGC described the suspension of payments proceeding under the Mexi-
can Bankruptcy and Suspension of Payments Laws (MBSPL) as "somewhat analogous" to
Chapter 1l's reorganization proceedings under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Id
1 Id
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id
35 Id at 191. As an initial matter, the Third Circuit addressed the fact that PGMex had
not made a formal motion for a stay or transfer to the Mexican court. Id. at 191-92. The court
stated that usually a court, in determining whether to extend comity to a foreign proceeding,
rules in response to a motion by a party seeking a stay pending disposition of the foreign
proceeding. It& Nevertheless, the court concluded that PGMex's failure to make a formal
motion "does not compel the conclusion that the district court should not have extended
comity to the Mexican [bankruptcy] proceedings." Itt at 192. The court went on to state
that "whatever might be true in other cases, the absence of a formal motion does not matter
in this case." Id In this case, the court reasoned that the Letter Rogatory served the same
procedural function as a motion since it informed the district court and the parties of the
relief sought, and further, that PGMex's brief in support of the Letter Rogatory acted as the
"functional equivalent of a motion." I&d
36 The Philadelphia Gear court stated that since a court may, within its discretion, deny
comity to a foreign judicial proceeding, the court would review the extension or denial of
comity by the "abuse of discretion" standard. Id at 191.
37 It at 193-94. This holding made it unnecessary for the court to reach the merits of
PGMex's appeal from the grant of summary judgment to PGC. Itt at 191.
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dude that comity should have been denied as a matter of law, the
court vacated the order for summary judgment and remanded the ac-
tion to the district court.3 8 On remand, the district court was in-
structed to follow the procedure outlined in Philadelphia Gear, and to
explain the basis for its denial of comity to the Mexican bankruptcy
proceeding, should the district court so rule.3 9
Drawing on an earlier Third Circuit decision, Remington Rand
Corp. v. Business Systems Inc.,40 the court outlined the procedure that
the district court was to follow in determining whether or not to ex-
tend comity to the Mexican bankruptcy proceeding. A party seeking a
stay41 of a judicial proceeding in the United States, based on the exist-
ence of a foreign bankruptcy proceeding, must present a prima facie
case for a stay by demonstrating that: "(1) the foreign bankruptcy
court shares the U.S. policy of equitable distribution of assets; and (2)
the foreign law mandates the issuance or at least authorizes the request
for a stay."42 Then, if the party requesting comity has made such a
prima facie showing, which the Third Circuit held PGMex had made,
the district court, in exercising its discretion to grant or deny comity to
a foreign bankruptcy proceeding, should determine whether accord-
ing comity to the foreign bankruptcy proceedings "would be prejudi-
cial to the interest[s] of the United States."43 The court stated:
In making [this] inquiry, the court should assess, along with any other
issues it finds relevant, the following issues: (1) whether the [foreign
bankruptcy] court in which the proceedings are pending is a duly au-
thorized tribunal; (2) whether the [foreign bankruptcy law] provides
for equal treatment of creditors; (3) whether a stay would be "in some
manner inimical to [the U.S.] policy of [equal distribution of assets];"
and (4) whether [U.S. creditors] would be prejudiced by the stay.4 4
Moreover, the court expressly required that the district court, upon a
prima facie case being made, not dismiss the request for comity with-
out explaining its ruling and making factual findings on the comity
issue. 45
38 Id. at 193-94.
39 Id. at 194.
40 830 F.2d 1260 (3d Cir. 1987).
41 The court cautioned it was only addressing the issue of what procedure to follow in
determining when to "stay" an action based on comity, and was expressing no opinion on
what procedure to follow when presented with a request for a "transfer" to a foreign bank-
ruptcy court. See Philadelphia Gear, 44 F.3d at 194 n.7.
42 Id. at 193.
43 Id. at 194.
44 Id. In making these determinations, it may be necessary for the district court to con-
duct an evidentiary hearing, with expert testimony provided to ascertain foreign law and
procedures, especially where such matters may be in dispute, as was the case in Philadelphia
Gear. Id. at 193.
45 Id. at 193-94. The court was careful to point out that it was not requiring that a court,
whenever it exercises its discretion, explain the basis for its actions. An explanation, how-
ever, was required when exercising discretion in the area of comity. Id. at 191 n.4.
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b. The Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Roth agreed with the majority's view that the
district court "should have articulated its reasons for denying the Let-
ter Rogatory's request for comity,"46 but he disagreed that Remington47
led to the "broad view of comity" advanced by the majority. 48
Judge Roth argued that under Remington,49 it would have been
inappropriate to extend comity to the Mexican bankruptcy proceed-
ings.50 In his view, the issues argued on summary judgment in Philadel-
phia Gear resembled the types of issues that Remington had held as not
being precluded by considerations of comity.5 1 Judge Roth empha-
sized that because the district court's determination of the issues on
summary judgment would not affect assets held by PGMex in Mexico,
the district court's action did not impede the Mexican bankruptcy
court's ability to effectively distribute PGMex's assets to its creditors. 52
Thus, the district court would not have abused its discretion if it had in
fact decided that comity did not preclude it from determining the mer-
its of the summary judgment motions.53
III. Background Law
A. International Comity-General Piinciples
The concept of international comity has been aptly summarized as
follows:
[Comity is the] recognition which one! nation extends within its own
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another. It is
not a rule of law, but one of practice,,convenience, and expediency.
Although more than mere courtesy and accommodation, comity does
not achieve the force of an imperative or obligation. Rather, it is a
nation's expression of understanding which demonstrates due regard
both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of per-
sons protected by its own laws.
5 4
46 Id. at 194 (Roth,J., dissenting).
47 830 F.2d 1260 (3d Cir. 1987).
48 Philadelphia Gear, 44 F.3d at 194 (Roth, J., dissenting).
49 830 F.2d 1260.
50 Philadelphia Gear, 44 F.3d at 194 (Roth, J., dissenting).
51 Id. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding in Remington, see infra notes 155-
70 and accompanying text. In Remington, the Third Circuit upheld the district court's deter-
mination that defendant, a foreign corporation who had filed bankruptcy in The Nether-
lands, had misappropriated documents of the plaintiff, an American corporation, even
though no explanation was provided by the district court as to why it did not defer to the
Dutch bankruptcy proceedings, based on comity. 830 F.2d at 1265.
52 Philadelphia Gear, 44 F.3d at 195 (Roth, J., dissenting).
53 Id. (Roth, J., dissenting). Judge Roth went on to review (in the interest of judicial
,economy) the district court's grant of summary judgment, determining that summary judg-
ment was improperly granted because there existed numerous issues of material fact in dis-
pute. Id. (Roth, J., dissenting).
54 Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
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As a general rule, if a party requesting55 that comity be extended to a
foreign proceeding demonstrates that the foreign court is a court of
competent jurisdiction and that the laws and public policy of the fo-
rum nation and the rights of its residents will not be violated, comity
will usually be granted to the foreign judgment or proceeding. 56 CoM-
ity should be denied only when its extension would be prejudicial to the
interests of the forum nation.5 7
B. Comity in the Foreign Bankruptcy Context
1. Policy Considerations
Policy considerations are implicated whenever a U.S. court is
presented with a request for comity to be extended to a foreign bank-
ruptcy proceeding. A court, in making its determination whether or
not to extend comity to the foreign bankruptcy proceedings, must
carefully balance what are often competing domestic and foreign pol-
icy concerns.58
a. Pro-Comity Policy Considerations
In the foreign bankruptcy arena, several policy considerations
make the extension of comity to foreign bankruptcy proceedings par-
ticularly appropriate. 59 U.S. courts recognize the interest that foreign
courts have in liquidating or winding up the affairs of their own do-
mestic businesses, 60 and the Supreme Court has, since 1883, put those
who do business with foreign corporations on notice that they are im-
pliedly subjecting themselves to foreign bankruptcy laws.61 As such,
creditors of a bankrupt foreign corporation may be required to assert
their claims against the foreign bankrupt before a foreign bankruptcy
55 A request for comity usually requires the party seeking comity to make a motion to
the U.S. court in which the action is pending, requesting that the action be stayed, trans-
ferred, or dismissed on the grounds of comity. But see supra note 35, where the Philadelphia
Gear court waived the requirement of a formal motion for comity.
56 Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 457 (2d Cir. 1985); accord
Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 629 (2d Cir. 1976); Kenner Prods. Co. v. Societe
Fonciere Et Financiere Agache-Willot, 532 F. Supp. 478, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Pravin Banker
Assoc. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 165 Bankr. 379, 384 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
57 Somportex, 453 F.2d at 440; see also Matter of Colorado Corp., 531 F.2d 463, 468 (10th
Cir. 1976); 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 6 (1964).
58 See infra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
59 Victrix S.S. Co., SA v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709, 713 (2d Cir. 1987)
("American courts have long recognized the particular need to extend comity to foreign
bankruptcy proceedings.").
60 Cunard, 773 F.2d at 458.
61 Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 537-39 (1883) (holding that U.S. bond-
holders of a Canadian railroad company were bound by the Canadian reorganization plan
and were barred from suing in a New York court to recover on the bonds). It is important to
note, however, that in Gebhard, the reorganization plan was created by the Canadian govern-
ment via statute and that the Court's analysis seemed to be heavily influenced by this fact. See
Morales & Deutsch, supra note 2, at 1578-79.
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court.62 The most compelling rationale for extending comity to for-
eign bankruptcy proceedings is the need for the centralization of
claims against a bankrupt debtor's assets to ensure that the assets of
the debtor may be distributed to creditors in an "equitable, orderly
and systematic manner,"63 instead of in a "haphazard, erratic or piece-
meal fashion."6 4 Because a fundamental principle of U.S. bankruptcy
law is that a debtor's assets be distributed equally and fairly among
creditors of similar standing,65 if the foreign bankruptcy law shares this
"fundamental principle of equality,"6 6 the extension of comity to the
foreign bankruptcy proceeding will be heavily favored. 67
b. Anti-Comity Policy Considerations
Despite the foregoing policies encouraging comity,6 8 the exten-
sion of comity to foreign bankruptcy proceedings is neither mandatory
nor automatic. Because comity is an exercise of a court's discretion in
light of the facts of a specific case,69 U.S. courts are free to balance
potentially conflicting policy considerations and to deny comity to for-
eign bankruptcy proceedings.
Cutting against the extension of comity is a court's duty to protect
U.S. creditors from being forced to press their claims in a foreign pro-
ceeding wherein "their claims will be treated in some manner inimical"
to the U.S. policy of equality.70 As a result of this rather vague stan-
62 Cunard, 773 F.2d at 458-59; Remington Rand Corp. v. Business Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d
1260, 1271 (3d Cir. 1987).
63 Cunard, 773 F.2d at 458.
64 Id.
65 Remington, 830 F.2d at 1271; see also Cunard 773 F.2d at 459 ("The guiding premise of
the Bankruptcy Code... is the equality of distribution of assets among creditors."); Kenner
Prods. Co. v. Societe Fonciere Et Financiere Agache-Willot, 532 F. Supp. 478, 479 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) ("United States bankruptcy law itself provides for... [the] efficient and fair distribu-
tion of assets ... ").
66 Remington, 830 F.2d at 1271; see also Cunard, 773 F2d at 459 ("The guiding premise of
the Bankruptcy Code... is the equality of distribution of assets among creditors."); Kenner,
532 F. Supp. at 479 ("United States bandruptcy law itself provides for... [the] efficient and
fair distribution of assets ....").
67 See, e.g., Kenner, 532 F. Supp. at 479 (citing Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Serv., Ltd.,
471 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)) (where the laws or public policy of the United
States are not violated, it is the "firm policy of American courts [to stay] actions against a
corporation which is the subject of a bankruptcy proceeding in another jurisdiction"); see also
In Re Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Publicos, S.N.C., 91 B.R. 661, 667 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1988) ("so long as the foreign law is not repugnant to our own, the scale will ordinarily tip in
favor of having the foreign tribunal liquidate claims against the estate") [hereinafter Ba-
nobras]. However, the Banobras court concluded that comity should be denied to the foreign
bankruptcy proceeding pending in Mexico because resolution of the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement at issue before the court would require "special expertise" in Ameri-
can labor law, an area in which important Congressional policy considerations abound. Id. at
667-68.
68 See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
69 See Morales & Deutsch, supra note 2, at 1576.
70 Remington Rand Corp. v. Business Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1271 (3d Cir. 1987)
(citing Banque de Financement SA v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 568 F.2d 911, 921 (2d Cir.
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dard, the obligation to protect the interests of U.S. citizens may act as a
significant limitation on the extension of comity.71 Further, while U.S.
courts recognize the interests of foreign courts in winding up the af-
fairs of their domestic business debtors, there are exceptions to this
general policy. 72 Some New York courts have stated that they will defer
to foreign bankruptcy proceedings only once they have satisfied them-
selves that the foreign authority has jurisdiction over the bankrupt
debtor, and that "the foreign proceeding has not resulted in injustice
to New York citizens, prejudice to creditors' New York statutory remedies,
or violation of the laws or public policy of the [United States] .. .
By using such an imprecise standard to determine whether comity
should be granted, the courts can effectively require that the foreign
bankruptcy proceeding be, in essence, almost identical to that of the
United States. 74 Moreover, courts remain free to consider reciprocal
comity75 as a factor when determining whether to extend comity to a
foreign bankruptcy proceeding, 76 although this is generally disfavored
as a condition to a U.S. court extending comity to a foreign bankruptcy
proceeding. 77
1977)); see also supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. "fundamental
principle of equality").
71 See Morales & Deutsch, supra note 2, at 1576; see also Victrix S.S. Co., SA v. Salen Dry
Cargo A.B., 65 B.R. 466, 468 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (before extending comity, a court must
first make sure that forum creditors will be protected in the foreign proceeding). However,
the Victrix court did note that "the modem view rejects parochial protection of local creditors
in the absence of a demonstration that their rights are unprotected in the foreign forum."
Id.
72 Drexel Burnham Lambert Group v. Galadari, 777 F.2d 877, 880 (2d Cir. 1985).
73 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 629 (2d Cir.
1976)).
74 However, recent decisions by New York courts have generally construed these
grounds for the denial of comity as narrow :'exceptions" to comity when the foreign jurisdic-
tion requesting comity is a sister common-law jurisdiction with bankruptcy procedures similar
to the those of the United States. Se, e.g., Clarkson, 544 F.2d at 630 (Canadian bankruptcy
proceedings should be given recognition because Canada is a sister common-law jurisdiction
with procedures "akin" to those of the United States.); cf Kenner Prods. Co. v. Societe
Fonciere Et Financiere Agache-Willot, 532 F. Supp. 478, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (where the
court extended comity to French bankruptcy proceedings, stating that New York courts nar-
rowly construe exceptions to the comity doctrine and will enforce foreign rights unless the
court's enforcement of such rights would lead to enforcement of a transaction "inherently
vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense" (quoting Int'l Hotels
Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 13 (1924))).
75 The concept of "reciprocal comity" refers to a U.S. court granting comity to a foreign
bankruptcy proceeding only if that sovereign nation's courts extend comity to U.S. bank-
ruptcy proceedings or judgments.
76 Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 460 (2d Cir. 1985); see Rem-
ington Rand Corp. v. Business Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1273 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that due
to the unusual circumstances of the case, comity had to be a "two-way street" and that while
reciprocity was not a condition to comity, it has always been a "permissible consideration").
77 See, e.g., Cunard, 773 F.2d at 460 ("proof of reciprocity is not essential for the granting
of comity"); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir.
1971) (reciprocity is no longer an absolute condition precedent to comity). But see supra
note 65 for a discussion of the Remington court's requirement that comity be reciprocal in
that case.
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2. Judicial Approaches to the Interpretation of Comity
Historically, the United States has not been very cooperative when
faced with the prospect of extending comity to foreign bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. 78 The attitude of U.S. courts toward foreign bankruptcies
has generally been one of hostility,79 with the courts demonstrating
"an overt nationalistic bias favoring American creditors."80 Two con-
trasting approaches in dealing with foreign bankruptcy proceedings
have emerged from the century that U.S. courts have been involved in
international bankruptcies:81 the "territoriality" approach and the
"universality" approach.8 2 The United States has adopted neither ap-
proach completely. 83
a. The Territoriality Approach
The territoriality approach presumes that bankruptcy laws should
not be recognized beyond a country's borders.84 Under this approach,
each country has its own bankruptcy laws and will not recognize the
extraterritorial effect of bankruptcy proceedings decided, or pending,
elsewhere.85 The advantage of the territoriality approach is that local
78 Richard A. Gitlin & Evan D. Flaschen, The International Void In the Law of Multinational
Bankruptcies, 42 Bus. LAw. 307, 314 (1987); see also Charles D. Booth, Recognition of Foreign
Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Critique of the Inconsistent Approaches of United States Courts, 66 AM.
BANKR. Lj. 135, 136 (1992).
79 See Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 78, at 314.
80 See Morales & Deutsch, supra note 2, at 1579.
81 Although the courts have dealt with international bankruptcies for over a century,
U.S. courts have not dealt with this issue frequently, and the body of law that has emerged is
somewhat confusing and inconsistent. See Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 78, at 314; Morales &
Deutsch, supra note 2, at 1575.
82 See infra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
83 See Booth, supra note 78, at 139. The modem trend (led mainly by the Second Cir-
cuit) appears to be favoring the universality approach. See, e.g., Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter
Group, 994 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1993); Victrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d
709 (2d Cir. 1987); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985); In
Re Enercons Virginia, Inc., 812 F.2d 1469 (4th Cir. 1987); In Re Colorado Corp., 531 F.2d
463 (10th Cir. 1976); Kenner Prods. Co. v. Societe Fonciere Et Financiere Agache-Willot, 532
F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
However, other courts continue to employ a territorial approach towards foreign bank-
ruptcies, thus favoring domestic creditors' interests. See, e.g., Remington Rand Corp. v. Busi-
ness Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d 1260 (3d Cir. 1987); Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights of the M/Vs
Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988), appeal dismissed, 878 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1989);
Overseas Inns SA. v. United States, 911 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1990); United Kingdom Mutual
S.S. Assur. Assn. v. Continental Maritime of San Francisco, No. C-91-2798, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13485 (D. N.Ca. Aug. 31, 1992); In Re Toga, 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
Even the Second Circuit has exhibited territorial tendencies in recent years. See In Re Liqui-
dating Comm. of Papeleras Reunidas, SA., 92 Bankr. 584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988).
For a discussion of the U.S. courts' inconsistent approaches to foreign bankruptcies, see
generally Todd Kraft & Allison Aranson, Transnational Bankruptcies: The Section 304 and Be-
yond, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. RFv. 329 (1993) (urging adoption of the "Model International
Insolvency Cooperation Act" (MIICA)); Tandi A. Panuska, The Chaos of International Insolvency
- Achieving Reciprocal Universality Under Section 304 or MI1CA, 6 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 373 (1993)
(suggesting either requiring reciprocity under § 304 or adopting MIICA).
84 See Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 78, at 309; Booth, supra note 78, at 138.
85 See Booth, supra note 78, at 138.
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creditors benefit from local preferences and are not inconvenienced
by having to dispute their claims under foreign laws.86 The disadvan-
tages of the territoriality approach, however, are that it hinders the
principle of treating creditors equally and creates an incentive for par-
ties to "race to the courthouse."8 7 This approach also leads to the inef-
ficient distribution of assets and "create[s] instability for companies
engaging in international business transactions."
8a
b. The Universality Approach
In contrast, the universality approach posits that all of the debtor's
assets, in whatever country located, be subject to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the court in which the bankruptcy case is pending.89 Under
this approach, creditors worldwide are required to submit their claims
to the original bankruptcy court.v0 A trustee is appointed by the origi-
nal bankruptcy court to collect all assets of the debtor worldwide and
to seek the turnover of those assets to the original bankruptcy court.9 1
The original bankruptcy court's final determination is recognized by
all other countries.92 The advantages of the universality approach are
that all creditors share equally in the distribution of the debtor's assets;
it is more cost efficient since duplicate proceedings in other countries
are avoided; and there is increased cooperation and uniformity among
countries worldwide.93 The primary disadvantage is that local credi-
tors may suffer inconvenience and hardship in litigating their claims in
a foreign forum, where substantive and procedural laws may differ
from those of the locality.9
4
3. Congressional Enactment of Section 304
Prior to the enactment of section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, 95
86 It/
87 ld.
88 Id
89 See Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 78, at 309; Booth, supra note 78, at 137-38.
90 See Booth, supra note 78, at 138.
91 Id.
92 Id,
93 Id,
94 Id
95 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1978). Section 304 applies only to cases ancillary to foreign pro-
ceedings, and provides as follows:
(a) A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding is commenced by the filing with
the bankruptcy court of a petition under this section by a foreign
representative.
(b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, ifa party in inter-
est does not timely controvert the petition, or after trial, the court may
(1) enjoin the commencement or continuation of
(A) any action against
(i) a debtor with respect to property involved in such foreign
proceeding; or
(ii) such property; or
(B) the enforcement of any judgment against the debtor with respect
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U.S. courts had little statutory guidance on how to approach a com-
plex international bankruptcy dispute. 96 Instead, the courts were
forced to rely mainly on the doctrine of international comity to resolve
what action they should take when confronted with a foreign bank-
ruptcy proceeding. 9 7 As a result, the courts wound up with a body of
"confused and conflicting case law governing the adjudication of" in-
ternational bankruptcy disputes,98 with U.S. courts initially (and for a
long time thereafter) favoring the territoritality approach, and only re-
cently moving towards the universality approach. 99
In light of such confusion, in 1978, Congress attempted to facili-
tate the cooperation of bankruptcy courts worldwide by enacting sec-
tion 304 of the Bankruptcy Code.10 0 Section 304 was created to assist a
foreign representative 10 1 in bringing an ancillary bankruptcy proceed-
ing10 2 in the United States, and was intended to apply only when the
foreign debtor has "a place of business, or property" in the United
States.1 03 Nevertheless, section 304 has been viewed by the courts as
"express [ing] Congressional recognition of an American policy favor-
ing comity for bankruptcy proceedings."1 0 4 Since section 304 was en-
to such property, or any act or the commencement or continuation of
any judicial proceeding to create or enforce a lien against the prop-
erty of such estate;
(2) order turnover of the property of such estate, or the proceeds of such
property, to such foreign representative; or
(3) order other appropriate relief.
(c) In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b) of this section,
the court shall be guided by what will best assure the economical and expedi-
tious administration of such estate, consistent with
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such
estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and
inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of
such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with
the order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the
individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.
96 See, e.g., Remington Rand Corp. v. Business Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1271 (3d Cir.
1987).
97 See Morales & Deutsch, supra note 2, at 1575-76.
98 Id. at 1583.
99 Id. at 1579; see also Booth, supra note 78, at 139.
100 For the full text of § 304, see supra note 95.
101 A "foreign representative" is a trustee, administrator, or other representative of a
debtor's estate in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (Supp. V 1993).
102 An "ancillary proceeding" is one that is commenced in the United States, by a foreign
representative charged with handling the debtor's estate, in aid of the principal (or original)
bankruptcy proceeding abroad. See Booth, supra note 78, at 151. See generally Booth, supra
note 78, for a comprehensive overview of how § 304 operates.
103 Id. at 159.
104 Remington Rand Corp. v. Business Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1271 (3d Cir. 1987). In
Remington, the court was dealing with a non-§ 304 proceeding; however, the Third Circuit
looked to § 304 to determine whether Congress had enunciated an expression of public
policy to assist the court in determining whether or not to extend comity to the foreign
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acted in 1978, courts addressing the extension of comity to foreign
bankruptcy proceedings (where the foreign representative has not filed
a section 304105 ancillary proceeding in the United States) have relied
on the congressional policy behind section 304 and section 304(c) fac-
tors1 0 6 to aid them in determining whether or not comity should be
extended to the foreign bankruptcy proceedings. 107
C. Case Law Applying the Doctrine of Comity
Despite the belief that Congress favors comity, U.S. courts have
continued to struggle with the basic underlying question presented in
Philadelphia Gear: when should a U.S. court stay a domestic action
properly before the court by extending comity to a foreign bankruptcy
proceeding?108 Although resolution of this question depends substan-
tially on the specific facts of each particular case, the modern trend, as
evidenced by recent Second Circuit decisions, seems to favor recogni-
tion of foreign bankruptcy proceedings. 10 9
In the often cited case1 10 of Cunard Steamship Co. v. Salen Reefer
Services AB,111 the debtor, a Swedish company, commenced a bank-
ruptcy proceeding in Sweden. 112 The Swedish court appointed an ad-
ministrator to supervise the estate of the debtor, and entered an order
bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 1271-72. Several commentators have also interpreted § 304 as
adopting a universality approach. See Kraft & Aranson, supra note 83, at 338.
105 Foreign bankrupt debtors are not obligated to seek relief under § 304. Their foreign
representatives are allowed to seek the extension of comity by filing a motion for a stay,
transfer, or dismissal on the grounds of comity. SeeCunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB,
773 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir. 1985) (Section 304 is not the exclusive remedy for foreign repre-
sentatives because the legislative history makes it clear that the section was not intended to
abrogate the doctrine of comity); In re Enercons Virginia, Inc., 812 F.2d 1469, 1472 (4th Cir.
1987) (stating that nothing in the language of § 304 precludes a court from recognizing, as a
matter of comity, a request by a foreign representative for a stay or injunction).
106 "Comity" itself is listed as a factor to be considered when seeking relief under § 304.
See 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (5) (1982). For a list of all six factors in § 304(c), see supra note 95.
107 Although not controlling, § 304 has been relied on by analogy in several non-§ 304
cases. See, e.g., Remington, 830 F.2d 1260; Enercons, 812 F.2d 1469.
108 Philadelphia Gear addressed extending comity only by staying a domestic proceeding
in favor of a pending foreign bankruptcy proceeding. 44 F.3d at 194 n.7 (3d Gir. 1994).
However, courts, when extending comity, may grant a motion to transfer or dismiss the do-
mestic proceedings. See, e.g., Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter Group, 994 F.2d 996 (2d Cir.
1993) (dismissing creditors' domestic action in favor of foreign bankruptcy proceeding);
New Line Int'l Releasing Inc. v. Ivex Films, S.A, 140 B.R. 342 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (dis-
missing domestic action in favor of foreign bankruptcy proceeding); Kenner Prods. Co. v.
Societe Fonciere Et Financiere Agache-Willot, 532 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (transferring
creditor's domestic action).
109 See Morales & Deutsch, supra note 2, at 1579.
110 See, e.g., Allstate, 994 F.2d at 999; Overseas Inns S.A. v. United States, 911 F.2d 1146,
1149 (2d Cir. 1990); Enercons, 812 F.2d at 1472; Remington, 830 F.2d at 126; Victrix S.S. Co.,
SA. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709, 713 (2d Cir. 1987); Drexel Burnham Lambert
Group v. Galadari, 777 F.2d 877, 880 (2d Cir. 1985); Pravin Banker Assoc. v. Banco Popular
del Peru, 165 B.RL 379, 384 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
111 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985).
112 Id. at 454.
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staying creditor actions against the debtor.'1 3 Subsequently, plaintiff,
an English creditor, obtained an order of attachment against some of
the debtor's assets located in the United States.' 14 The district court
vacated the attachment, determining that the public policy of the
United States" 5 would be furthered by extending comity to the Swed-
ish proceedings and by recognizing the Swedish court's stay on credi-
tor actions.' 16 In upholding the district court's extension of comity to
the Swedish bankruptcy proceedings," 7 the Second Circuit empha-
sized pro-comity policy considerations: the Swedish proceeding was
procedurally fair; Swedish law shared the U.S. policy of equal distribu-
tion of assets; and there was no indication that the creditor would be
prejudiced if it were forced to participate in the Swedish bankruptcy
proceedings." 8
Similarly, in Lindner Fund, Inc. v. Polly Peck Int'l PLC,"9 Polly Peck,
a British corporation, applied to the British court for an "Administra-
tion Order"' 20 to permit Polly Peck to reorganize. 1 1 Under British
law, a stay similar to the automatic stay provided by the filing of a
Chapter 11 petition in the United States was triggered which prohib-
ited the commencement or continuation of any proceeding against
Polly Peck or its property. 22 Plaintiffs, U.S. creditors, then filed an
action alleging securities law violations and negligence. 123 The district
court extended comity to the British bankruptcy proceedings by dis-
Is JJd
114 Id. The debtor then moved in district court to dissolve the attachment. Id.
115 The court was referring to the U.S. policy of providing for the equitable distribution
of assets. Id. at 459.
116 Id. at 454.
117 The court pointed out that although the debtor's foreign representative (here, an
administrator) could have brought an ancillary action pursuant to § 304, the administrator was
not precluded from requesting that comity be extended to the Swedish bankruptcy proceed-
ings instead, Id. at 455-56.
118 Id. at 459-60. See also Victrix S.S. Co., SA v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709 (2d
Cir. 1987), where, in an action against the same bankrupt debtor, plaintiff, a Panamanian
creditor, had obtained both a British arbitration award and a British judgment against the
Swedish debtor, who was in bankruptcy proceedings in Sweden. Id. at 714. The creditor
then obtained an order of attachment against some of the debtor's New York assets. Id. at
711. When the creditor moved in district court to enforce its foreign award and judgment,
the district court denied creditor's motion and vacated the attachment. Id. at 712. The Sec-
ond Circuit agreed with the district court's decision, stating that Cunard governed this action,
and that in light of the debtor's ongoing bankruptcy proceeding in Sweden, enforcing the
British award and judgment would conflict with the U.S. policy of ensuring the equitable
distribution of the local assets of a foreign bankrupt. Id. at 714. The court also noted that
any distribution of the debtor's limited assets would affect the other creditors who had not
participated in the British proceedings, but who had instead obeyed the Swedish court's stay
and sought relief in the Swedish bankruptcy proceeding. Id.
119 143 B.R. 807 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
120 An "Administration Order" is similar to a petition under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, which deals with reorganizations. Id. at 808 n.2.
121 Id. at 808.
122 li. at 809.
123 Id.
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missing the domestic action. 124 The court stated that "comity is regu-
larly [extended] to bankruptcy proceedings in sister common-law
jurisdictions because there is a presumption that such proceedings are
fair and comport with American notions of due process."1 25 Since pro-
cedures under the British bankruptcy act were comparable to proce-
dures under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the court concluded that
extending, comity to the British bankruptcy proceeding was
appropriate. 12 6
In Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter Group127 the court, proceeding on a
very expansive view of comity, upheld the district court's dismissal of
two securities fraud actions brought in. district court by U.S. creditors,
in favor of pending liquidation proceedings in Australia. 128 The Sec-
ond Circuit determined that even the presence of a forum selection
and choice of law clause 12 9 in the Indebenture Agreement did "not
preclude a court from granting comity where it was otherwise war-
ranted."1 30 The court stated that although Australian bankruptcy pro-
cedures differed slightly from U.S. bankruptcy procedures, 3 1 the
124 I. at 810.
125 Id.; see also Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 630 (2d Cir. 1976) (recognizing
the right of a Canadian trustee in bankruptcy to obtain records of the foreign bankrupt
debtor which were located in the debtor's New York offices, and stating that when dealing
with sister common-law jurisdictions, such as Canada, exceptions to extending comity should
be narrowly construed, since these jurisdictions' procedures are similar to those of the
United States).
126 Lindner Fund, 143 B.R. at 810. The court observed that the dismissal of the creditors'
action would not unduly prejudice the creditors since by filing their claims in the British
bankruptcy proceeding, they would be placed in the same position as Polly Peck's other
creditors. Id. More importantly, even if the action had been allowed to proceed in district
court, the creditors would still be forced to go to England to collect any judgment in their
favor, since Polly Peck had no assets in the United States. Id.
127 994 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1993). Two actions were consolidated for this appeal. Both
actions were brought by U.S. creditors who had invested in the Australian debtor companies.
Id. at 997. The Australian debtors had filed for liquidation in Australia before these actions
were commenced in district court. Id. at 997-98.
128 Id. at 1000.
129 The Indebenture Agreement contained a clause selecting New York as the forum for
dispute settlements and New York law to govern the agreement. Id.
130 Id. The Linter court was not the first court to conclude that forum selection clauses
were not dispositive on the issue of comity. See Kenner Prods. Co. v. Societe Fonciere et
Financiere Agache-Willot, 532 F. Supp. 478, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In Kenner, the district
court transferred the creditor's action to the court's suspense docket, pending a termination
of the bankruptcy proceedings that the debtor was currently involved with in France. Id. at
480. The court found that a choice of venue clause contained in a guaranty of trade credit
did not override "concerns for comity and judicial efficiency." Id. at 479. While such clauses
were prima facie valid, they would not be enforced if doing so would be "unreasonable." Id.
at 479-80. The court stated that "public policy [was] a key factor in making a determination
of reasonableness." Id. For criticism of the Kenner court's interpretation of choice of venue
clauses, see Morales & Deutsch, supra note 2, at 1583.
131 Creditors argued that Australian bankruptcy law differed significantly from that of
the United States because Australian law provides a stay by leave of court only, whereas the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides for the automatic staying of creditor actions once a bankrupt
debtor filed for bankruptcy. Linter, 994 F.2d at 999. Creditors challenged this difference as
being fundamentally unfair to creditors. Id.
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difference was irrelevant because what was really important was that
Australian law provided a stay procedure to centralize claims and to
ensure the equitable distribution of assets.' 32 Because Australian law
provided this protection, affording comity to the Australian bank-
ruptcy proceedings did not violate U.S. law or public policy.' 3 3
By contrast, in those recent cases where courts have refused to
extend comity to foreign bankruptcy proceedings,, the courts have
based their decisions on either a clear violation of U.S. public pol-
icy,' 3 4 or a narrow exception based on the particular facts of the
case. 
13 5
In Drexel Burnham Lambert Group v. Galadari'3 6 the Second Circuit
refused to uphold the district court's extension of comity 3 7 to liquida-
tion proceedings in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, after concluding
that further inquiry into the fairness of the Dubai bankruptcy proce-
dures and its consonance with U.S. bankruptcy law was necessary138
The court was concerned that U.S. courts had no experience with
Dubai bankruptcy procedures, and that there existed disputed issues of
material fact as to whether or not Dubai bankruptcy law was fair.139
The court remanded the action to the district court with instructions
that the district court conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine
these issues, and that Drexel be afforded reasonable discovery.140 The
Second Circuit's main consideration in denying comity at this stage of
the proceedings was the need for information from which the district
court could find that the foreign bankruptcy procedures were consis-
tent with the U.S. policy of equitable distribution of assets. 141
132 Id. at 999-1000.
133 Id. The court pointed out that there was no evidence suggesting that the U.S. credi-
tors would be prejudiced by being required to maintain their actions in Australia, especially
since they had been given notice of all that occurred in the Australian bankruptcy proceed-
ings, were represented in those proceedings, and had filed two other securities actions, simi-
lar to the actions before the district court, in other Australian courts. Id. at 1000.
134 Of course, a court's ability to deny comity on the ground that the extension of comity
in a particular case would "violate public policy," a rather undefined concept, could threaten
to swallow up the recently-emerging general rule favoring the extension of comity.
135 See infra notes 142-54 and accompanying text.
136 777 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1985).
137 The district court had granted the debtor's representative's (composed of a commit-
tee of receivers appointed by decree of the Dubai government) motion to dismiss securities
fraud action brought by the creditor (Drexel) which was pending before the court, basing its
decision on the comity doctrine. Id. at 878.
138 1& at 881.
139 Id.
140 ILd. On remand, the district court found that the Dubai bankruptcy proceedings were
"consistent with [the U.S.] basic notions of fairness and due process" and "fundamentally fair
to all creditors." Drexel Burnham Lambert Group v. Galadari, No.84-2602, 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5030, at *49 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). In making this showing, it was not necessary for the
Dubai bankruptcy procedures (established by a government decree) to be "substantially simi-
lar" to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. It was sufficient to show that the approach adopted by the
Dubai proceeding was fundamentally fair. Id. The district court then stayed the action, ex-
tending comity to the pending Dubai bankruptcy proceedings Id. at *71.
141 DrexeL 777 F.2d at 881.
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In Petition of Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Publicos, S.N.C. (Ba-
nobras),142 the bankruptcy court denied comity to a Mexican bank-
ruptcy proceeding on the grounds that resolving the action involved
the construction of U.S. labor law, 143 "a specialized area of the law
laced with strong policy considerations." 144 The court found that the
plaintiffs would be "severely prejudiced" 145 if forced to litigate their
claims-which stemmed from a disputed collective bargaining agree-
ment-in Mexico where the Mexican bankruptcy court would be
called upon to construe and apply U.S. labor law, an area in which
traditional contract principles were not strictly applied, and in which
policy considerations abound. 146 Thus, the Banobras court etched a
limited and well-defined exception to the general rule favoring the ex-
tension of comity: a court could deny comity when the law to be ap-
plied by a foreign bankruptcy court required "special expertise" in an
area of U.S. law having strong policy overtones. 147
In Overseas Inns S.A. P.A. v. United States,148 a Luxembourg corpo-
ration had filed for bankruptcy in Luxembourg and had obtained a
court-approved reorganization plan. 149 The Luxembourg bankrupt
debtor requested that the district court grant comity to the Luxem-
bourg judgment and reorganization plan which would have allowed
the debtor to satisfy its U.S. income tax obligations by paying a fraction
of the taxes actually owed.150 The Fifth Circuit upheld the district
court's denial of comity, stating that the U.S. has a strong public policy
favoring the payment of taxes owed, even by a taxpayer in bank-
ruptcy.151 The court noted that under U.S. bankruptcy law, the Inter-
142 91 B.R. 661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). Although this is a § 304 ancillary action, the
court stated that "[w] hen asked to grant relief pursuant to § 304, American courts are to be
guided by principles of international comity and respect for the laws of other nations." Id. at
667. The court's analysis stressed the comity factor, § 304(c) (5), more heavily than the other
factors. Id.
143 In Banobras, plaintiffs, employees of the Mexican airline, Aeromexico, which was
owned by Aeronaves, sought declaratory relief that a collective bargaining agreement was in
full force, and requested that the court determine their rights according to the agreement.
I. at 663. Subsequent to the filing of the action for declaratory relief, Aeronaves com-
menced bankruptcy proceedings in Mexico, and the bankruptcy trustee sought an injunction
under § 304 to prevent U.S. creditors from pursuing claims against Aeronaves or going after
its assets located in the United States. Id. at 663-64. The injunction was granted. hI. at 664.
Plaintiffs then sought to have the injunction modified to allow their action for declaratory
judgment to proceed in the United States. Id. at 662.
144 1. at 667.
145 Id.
146 ld. at 667-68.
147 id,
148 911 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1990).
149 ld. at 1147. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the creditor in this action, had
received a copy of the plan but had not entered an appearance in the Luxembourg bank-
ruptcy proceedings or filed a claim with the foreign court because the IRS' policy was not to
participate in such proceedings since it usually was awarded less than the amount actually
owed. I.
150 Id at 1147-48.
151 Id. at 1149.
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nal Revenue Service (IRS) was a secured creditor with priority status,
whereas under the Luxembourg reorganization plan, the IRS was to be
treated as an unsecured creditor.1 52 Comity, the court explained,
"does not reach so far as to allow one country to adversely affect an-
other's tax revenues. 155 The court held that Luxembourg bankruptcy
laws were clearly dissimilar to that of the United States, and that ex-
tending comity to the Luxembourg judgment would therefore preju-
dice the United States.154
In the case most relied upon by the Philadelphia Gear court, Rem-
ington Rand Corp. v. Business Systems Inc.,155 special circumstances led
the court to create a specific plan for the extension of comity to for-
eign bankruptcy proceedings. In Remington, Remington U.S. had filed
a claim in district court against BSI B.V. and BSI U.S. 156 alleging that
BSI B.V. had misappropriated documents containing Remington U.S.'
trade secrets in a typewriter.'5 7 Subsequent to the filing of the misap-
propriation claim, BSI B.V. entered into bankruptcy proceedings in
The Netherlands.1 58 While the Dutch bankruptcy proceedings were
pending, the district court ruled on Remington U.S.' misappropriation
claim, finding that BSI B.V. had misappropriated Remington U.S.'
152 1d.
153 I&
154 Id. at 1149-50. See also In re Liquidating Comm. of Papeleras Reunidas, SA., 92 B.R.
584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) [hereinafter Papeleras]. In Papeleras, the bankruptcy court dis-
missed the foreign representative's § 304 ancillary action, thereby allowing the U.S. creditor's
action to proceed against the Spanish bankrupt debtor. Id. at 595. The court refused to
extend comity to the Spanish bankruptcy proceedings on the ground that the creditors
would be prejudiced because of the dissimilarity between the relevant Spanish bankruptcy
laws and the U.S. bankruptcy laws. I. at 591. Under U.S. bankruptcy laws, the creditor in
this action (who had obtained ajudgment lien on the debtor's U.S. trademark) was classified
as a secured creditor, whereas under Spanish bankruptcy laws, a judgment lien creditor
would be classified as a general, unsecured creditor. Id Moreover, the court found that the
creditor had not received timely notice of the Spanish bankruptcy proceeding and was there-
fore not even listed as a creditor. Id. at 590-91. As a result, the creditor's rights had been
prejudiced. Id. For an in-depth critique of the Papeleras court's review of § 304(c) factors,
see Booth, supra note 78, at 192-200.
155 830 F.2d 1260 (3d Cir. 1987). The parties involved in this complex litigation are as
follows: Remington Rand Corporation, a U.S. corporation (hereinafter Remington U.S.); its
bankrupt subsidiary, Remington Rand B.V., a Dutch corporation (hereinafter Remington
B.V.); Business Systems, Inc., B.V., a Dutch corporation (hereinafter BSI B.V.); and its subsid-
iary, BSI Office Equipment, Inc. (hereinafter BSI U.S.). If the Note is referring to both BSI
B.V. and BSI U.S. collectively, "BSI" will be used.
156 The initial complaint was filed on August 17, 1981. Id. at 1262. The only defendant
listed at that time was BSI B.V. Id Remington U.S. subsequently amended its complaint on
May 11, 1983, to add BSI U.S. as a defendant. Id.
157 Id. Remington U.S. claimed the misappropriation occurred when BSI B.V. purchased
a Dutch plant previously owned by Remington U.S.' Dutch subsidiary, Remington B.V. Rem-
ington B.V. had filed for bankruptcy in The Netherlands. The purchase agreement was for
the sale of Remington B.V.'s Dutch plant and was entered into by BSI B.V. and the Dutch
trustees in charge of handling the estate of Remington B.V. Id.
158 Id. at 1263. BSI B.V. entered into suspension of payments proceedings in The
Netherlands on August 17, 1983, and was appointed a trustee by the Dutch court. Id A
"suspension of payments" proceeding is similar to filing a Chapter 11 petition for reorganiza-
tion under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 1262.
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trade secrets.1519 The district court entered an interim equitable relief
order 60 which required BSI to: (1) turn over copies of all documents
containing Remington U.S.' trade secrets in their possession; (2) ac-
count for all the goods it produced with the misappropriated docu-
ments; and (3) hold in trust all products or proceeds (wherever
located in the world) that BSI derived from the trade secrets, or alter-
natively, to provide security161 equivalent to their value. 162
The Third Circuit upheld the district court's finding that BSI B.V.
had misappropriated Remington U.S.' trade secrets 163 and the portion
of the equitable relief order requiring BSI to turn over the documents
it held.164 However, with respect to the district court's imposition of a
constructive trust on all products and proceeds that BSI derived world-
wide from the documents as a means of providing security for Reming-
ton U.S.' subsequent damages award, the Third Circuit stated that:
[T] o the extent that the district court order seeks to attach BSI assets in
the United States, it [would] not be disturbed. No international trap-
pings surround the district court's imposition of a constructive trust
over assets located in the United States. [The court] saw no aspects of
comity implicated here. 165
159 Id at 1263. The decision was entered on September 6, 1984. Id. The misappropria-
tion of trade secrets consisted of voluminous documents and drawings that came to be in the
possession of BSI B.V. as a result of its purchase of Remington B.V.'s plant in The Nether-
lands. Id. at 1268.
160 Id. at 1263. The interim equitable relief order was entered on September 6, 1984, to
provide security for the damages judgment that Remington U.S. was expected to secure,
once the extent of the damages for the tortious misappropriation of trade secrets was ascer-
tained. Id. Final judgment on damages was entered on June 27, 1986, at $221,409,481.00,
later increased as a result of sanctions imposed by the district court against BSI B.V. and its
trustee for contempt in failing to abide by the requirements of the equitable relief order. Id.
161 Id BSI could not post such security so that the requirement of holding the proceeds
in trust became mandatory. Id at 1267.
162 Id at 1263. BSI appealed, challenging the district court's finding of misappropria-
tion of trade secrets, id, and arguing that the district court had violated principles of interna-
tional comity by entering an order for equitable relief when BS1 B.V. was in suspension of
payments proceedings in The Netherlands. Id. at 1266.
163 Id at 1265. BSI also argued that because a Dutch court approved the trustees' sale to
BSI B.V. of Remington B.V.'s plant, which included the documents containing trade secrets,
comity precluded the district court from even inquiring into the propriety of the sale and
purchase agreement. Id at 1266. The Third Circuit responded that the district court had
not abused its discretion in refusing, on the grounds of comity, to refrain from inquiring into
the propriety of the trustees' sale because although the Dutch court handling Remington
B.V.'s bankruptcy had entered an order approving the sale of the Dutch plant, the district
court found that the know-how documents containing Remington U.S.' trade secrets were
not included within the Dutch court's order as an asset of the sale. Id at 166-67. Therefore,
the Dutch court's order approving the sale did not encompass the sale of the know-how
documents. Id.
164 Id at 1269. The turn-over order was entitled to compliance by BSI because the ques-
tion of ownership of the documents had been fully litigated in the district court and no
contrary ruling had been entered by the Dutch bankruptcy court. Id In fact, the Dutch
court had agreed with the turn-over order, provided that Remington U.S. pick up the docu-
ments in The Netherlands or else compensate BSI for its expenses in shipping the docu-
ments to the United States. Id The Third Circuit reasoned that the turn-over order "[did]
not offend comity or derogate[ ] the respect due the Dutch bankruptcy proceedings." Id.
165 Id at 1272 (emphasis added). On September 6, 1984, when the district court en-
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However, as to the attachment of BSI's foreign assets, the court stated
the same was not true.'6 Before that aspect of the order could be
upheld certain "conditions precedent" had to be satisfied. 167 The
court focused on the scope of the district court's equitable relief order,
emphasizing that the order "imposed a trust on all BSI assets anywhere
in the world," effectively tying up the bankrupt debtor, BSI B.V.'s, "en-
tire property for the ultimate benefit of Remington U.S., to the exclu-
sion of all other creditors."168 Because the constructive trust operated
directly on the property of the debtor outside the territorial limits of
the United States, involving property under the protection of the
Dutch bankruptcy laws, the equitable relief order interfered with the
administration of BSI B.V.'s bankruptcy in The Netherlands, and ig-
nored the very reasons for the doctrine of comity.169 However, due to
what the court deemed were special circumstances involved in the
case, the court proposed a detailed, case-specific "solution" before
comity could be extended to the Dutch bankruptcy proceedings. 170
IV. Analysis of the Case
The Philadelphia Gear court was presented with a district court,
which for reasons undisclosed in its opinion, had chosen to ignore a
foreign debtor's request for a stay of the declaratory judgment action
pending before it, even though the debtor, PGMex, was currently in-
volved in bankruptcy proceedings in Mexico. The decision in Philadel-
phia Gear'7 1 is an important one for two reasons: first, the procedure
the court outlined in its opinion for district courts to follow when de-
termining whether to extend comity to foreign bankruptcy proceed-
ings places a notable constraint on a district court's exercise of its
discretion in making comity determinations. 172 Second, the Philadel-
phia Gear court's opinion marks a clear shift in the Third Circuit's ap-
tered its constructive trust order, BSI B.V. was in bankruptcy proceedings, but BSI U.S., also a
defendant in the action, was not. Id. BSI U.S. held assets in the United States to which the
Dutch trustee laid claim, hI. Remington U.S. looked to these same assets for satisfaction of
its later-to-be-determined damages judgment. I. The district court had previously imposed
restrictions on these U.S. assets. Id. The Remington court stated that although such a restric-
tion "substantially hinder[ed] efforts by the BSI trustee to rehabilitate the debtor ... the
preexisting limitations on BSI U.S. did not directly frustrate the trustee's authority and ex-
tended only to assets in the United States." Id.
166 Id,
167 Id.
168 ld,
169 Id.
170 The Third Circuit's proposed solution involved the use of "reciprocal comity." I. at
1272-74.
171 Philadelphia Gear was decided solely on procedural grounds. The Third Circuit did
not rule on whether the district court's implicit denial of comity to the Mexican court's
Letter Rogatory was proper. Instead, the court remanded the action to the district court for
the district court to evaluate the request for comity in light of the factors outlined in the
Philadelphia Gear opinion, and for the district court to explain whatever decision it reached
with regards to the comity issue. 44 F.3d 187, 193-94 (3d Cir. 1994).
172 See infra notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
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proach to comity in the foreign bankruptcy context because it
represents the Third Circuit's adoption of a broader view of comity
than that which the court advocated when it decided Remington173 less
than a decade earlier. 174
A. The Procedure for Comity Determinations in the Bankruptcy
Context
In Philadelphia Gear, the Third Circuit held that if a district court is
presented with a prima facie request for a stay, the district court cannot
choose to exercise its discretion to deny comity to a foreign bankruptcy
proceeding without first considering the factors outlined in the Phila-
delphia Gear opinion.175 Moreover, a district court could not deny com-
ity to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding without clearly explaining why
its balancing of such factors mandated a denial of comity.
176
As an initial matter, a foreign debtor would be deemed to have
presented a prima facie case for a stay if the debtor showed: (1) that
the foreign country shares the U.S. policy of equal distribution of as-
sets, and (2) that the foreign law mandates or at least authorizes the
issuance of a stay. 17 7 Applying this relatively easy two-prong test to the
case before it, the court concluded that PGMex had established a
prima facie case for the extension of comity to the Mexican bankruptcy
proceeding because PGMex had presented the district court with a
legal opinion from a Mexican attorney which interpreted Mexican law
as complying with these two prongs.
1 78
Once the prima facie case has been established, the court seemed
to suggest that an implicit presumption favoring the extension of com-
ity to the foreign bankruptcy proceeding comes into play.179 The
court stated that the district court must now "consider the [comity]
matter further and . . .not dismiss the request out of hand without
explaining its ruling."18 0 The district court must evaluate the request
173 830 F.2d 1260 (3d Cir. 1987).
174 See infra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
175 Philadelphia Gear, 44 F.3d at 193-94.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 193.
178 As far as establishing the first prong, the court remarked that although the Mexican
attorney's opinion was somewhat ambiguous, the attorney's statement "seem[ed] to be stat-
ing" that Mexican bankruptcy law shared the U.S. policy of equal treatment of creditors, and
as for establishing the second prong, the attorney's statement that Mexican law mandates the
stay of the district court action was sufficient. Id. Although PGC, in opposing the extension
of comity, presented a legal opinion that denied that Mexican law complied with these two
prongs, the court stated that this difference in opinion was of no consequence at the prima
facie stage because disputes as to which party's interpretation of foreign law is the correct
one should be determined by the district court after an evidentiary hearing had been held.
Id.
179 Id. A presumption favoring comity is not an innovation of the Philadelphia Gear court.
Several Second Circuit decisions have recognized a presumption favoring the extension of
comity to foreign bankruptcy proceedings. See supra notes 111-33 and accompanying text.
180 Philadelphia Gear, 44 F.3d at 193.
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for a stay by relying on the following factors expressly delineated by the
court: (1) whether the foreign court is a duly authorized tribunal; (2)
whether the foreign law provides for equal treatment of creditors; (3)
whether a stay would be in some manner inimical to U.S. interests; and
(4) whether U.S. citizens would be prejudiced by the stay.18' Further,
if the interpretation of the foreign law is disputed by the parties, the
district court is required to conduct evidentiary hearings to ascertain
whether or not the foreign law and procedures are consonant with
those of the United States.182 If these factors are determined in favor
of the party seeking comity, the court's opinion seems to suggest that
the implicit presumption favoring comity requires that the district
court extend comity to the foreign bankruptcy proceeding by staying
the action oefore it. Thus, although a district court continues to have
substantial discretion 83 in determining whether comity should be ex-
tended to foreign bankruptcy proceedings, the court seems to place a
significant constraint on the district court's exercise of its discretion to
deny comity because the procedure outlined by the Third Circuit oper-
ates as a presumption favoring comity once a prima facie case for com-
ity is presented. This constraint results because the presumption
favoring comity requires the district court to make factual findings in
support of any denial of comity, instead of merely requiring the court
to explain why comity should be extended.
B. The Adoption of a Broad View of Comity
In establishing a procedure for district courts to follow when mak-
ing comity determinations in the bankruptcy context, the majority as-
serts that it is merely relying on its decision in Remington. 184 However,
as the dissenting opinion points out, the majority's reliance on Reming-
ton is misplaced because what the Third Circuit is really doing in Phila-
delphia Gear is adopting a "broad view of comity" not supported by
Remington.185
181 Id at 194. The Third Circuit compiled these factors by drawing from general princi-
ples of comity frequently referred to in the case law and organizing these principles into a
coherent, structured list of factors so that a district court would know exactly what it should
consider when making a comity determination.
182 Id. at 193.
183 Philadelphia Gear did provide the district courts with a specific list of factors to con-
sider in making comity determinations. Id. However, the third and fourth factors are rather
vague. Because the Third Circuit failed to define the parameters of these two factors, a
district court is left with substantial discretion in determining what is "in some manner inimi-
cal" to the interests of the United States, and what constitutes "prejudice" to a U.S. citizen.
Although the Second Circuit also relies on these vague factors in determining if comity
should be extended to foreign bankruptcy proceedings, the Second Circuit's case law speci-
fies that these factors are to be narrowly construed as "exceptions" to the rule favoring com-
ity. See supra note 78. The Third Circuit's Philadelphia Gear opinion, on the other hand,
provides no real indication whether it too intends the district courts to construe these factors
as narrow exceptions to the extension of comity.
184 830 F.2d 1260 (3d Cir. 1987).
185 Philadelphia Gear, 44 F.3d at 194 (Roth, J., dissenting).
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Judge Roth notes that in Remington, the doctrine of comity did not
prevent the Third Circuit from upholding the district court's determi-
nation of a misappropriation claim brought by a U.S. corporation
against a foreign debtor, even though the foreign debtor was involved at
the time in a Dutch bankruptcy proceeding. 18 6 The Remington court
did not even question why the district court chose to decide the misap-
propriation issue rather than to defer on the grounds of comity to the
Dutch bankruptcy proceedings. 187 Moreover, the Remington court
went so far as to uphold the district court's order attaching assets of
the foreign debtor which were located in the United States, stating that
the attachment of these assets did not implicate any aspect of comity,
despite the fact that the attachment prevented the Dutch bankruptcy
court's access to part of the debtor's assets and directly frustrated the
foreign court's authority to rehabilitate the debtor.' 8 8 The only aspect
of the district court's order that the Remington court believed had any
comity implications was the part of the order attaching the debtor's
foreign assets. 18 9
Thus, the dissent is correct in arguing that if the Philadelphia Gear
court were really following the dictates of Remington, the court should
have upheld the district court's determination of PGC's declaratory
judgment action, because the district court's determination of this ac-
tion would neither implicate PGMex's foreign assets located in Mexico
nor directly affect the ability of the Mexican bankruptcy court to dis-
tribute PGMex's assets to its creditors. 9 0 Instead, the procedure now
adopted by the Philadelphia Gear court, which implicitly incorporates a
presumption favoring comity and limits a district court's discretion in
denying comity, may reasonably be viewed as representing the Third
Circuit's shift away from the favoring of U.S. creditors and the court's
willingness to join the modern trend' 91 favoring the extension of com-
ity to foreign bankruptcy proceedings.
V. Conclusion
The court's opinion in Philadelphia Gear, if it indeed represents the
Third Circuit's attempt to advocate a more expansive view of comity as
186 Id. (Roth, J., dissenting).
187 Id. (Roth, J., dissenting).
188 Remington, 830 F.2d at 1272.
189 Id
190 Philadelphia Gear, 44 F.3d at 194-95 (Roth, J., dissenting).
191 For a discussion of cases following the modem trend, see supra notes 83, 111-33 and
accompanying text. See also Booth, supra note 78, at 139-47 for an outline of the develop-
ment of the modem trend favoring the extension of comity; Kraft & Aranson, supra note 83,
at 336 ("[B]efore the Code was amended to add § 304, the trend was for courts to recognize
foreign bankruptcy proceedings .... [T] he policy of universality has generally been em-
braced by the courts .... "). See generally Booth, supra note 78, for an evaluation of the
impact that § 304 has had on modem case law.
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the dissent claims,19 2 is clearly a step in the right direction in helping
district courts to deal with the increasing frequency with which they
are presented with disputes involving foreign bankruptcies. The
court's implicit recognition of a presumption favoring the extension of
comity to foreign bankruptcy proceedings makes it easier for district
courts to extend comity to foreign bankruptcy proceedings, at least in
those cases where the foreign debtor seeks a stay of action(s) pending
before the district court. Adoption of the "universality" approach to
the extension of comity in the foreign bankruptcy context is consistent
with the modern trend of courts, as evidenced by recent Second Cir-
cuit decisions.' 93 Moreover, a more generous approach to comity
helps further Congress' intention, as expressed by the enactment of
section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code' 9 4 to encourage cooperation
among countries worldwide to solve bankruptcy disputes as fairly and
as efficiently as possible. If courts extend comity to foreign bankruptcy
proceedings, claims against the debtor may be handled in a single
court, thereby preventing the squandering of a debtor's assets that in-
evitably results from the debtor being forced to litigate claims in courts
all over the world. As a result, the extension of comity to foreign bank-
ruptcy proceedings would help to ensure that there would be more
assets left for equitable distribution to all creditors, thus furthering the
"fundamental" public policy of U.S. bankruptcy law after all.' 9 5
CHRISTINE SANDEZ
192 Philadelphia Gear, 44 F.3d at 194 (Roth, J., dissenting).
193 See supra notes 111-33 and accompanying text.
194 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text, discussing the U.S. fundamental policy
of distributing a debtor's assets in a fair and equitable manner to creditors.
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